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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Michael John Anderson, 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
VS. Case NO. 940322-CA 
Charleen Ann Anderson, 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
/ 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an Interlocutory Appeal from an Order on Motion to 
Dismiss, signed and entered on May 9th, 1994, by the Honorable 
Judge David Young, of the Third District Court, Summit County, 
State of Utah. 
Jurisdiction is based on Title 78-2a-3(2)(i), and Rule 5 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Can the State of Utah properly assert personal 
jurisdiction over Defendant, Charleen Anderson, who, along with her 
children, has never resided in the State of Utah, nor otherwise 
availed herself of the protection of the laws of the State of Utah? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal are questions of law and as 
such, this court should not accord deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusions, but should review those conclusions for 
correctness• See Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 
839 P.2d 1121, at 1121. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code, Section 78-27-24; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal of the trial court's denial of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the 
parties. 
2. Course of the Proceedings. 
Plaintiff filed for Divorce in Summit County, Utah, 
requesting the Third District Court to take jurisdiction over the 
2 
parties, and to enter orders incident to a divorce/custody 
proceeding. Defendant responded to Plaintiff's divorce Complaint 
by filing a Motion to Dismiss, based upon the grounds that she and 
the minor children had never resided in the state of Utah. 
Defendant asserted that she had never availed herself of the laws 
of the state of Utah, and that therefore jurisdiction was lacking. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was never noticed for 
hearing, but was heard sua sponte by Judge David Young during and 
incident to a hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary 
Visitation. 
3. Disposition in the District Court. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was denied, and Plaintiff's 
Motion for Temporary Visitation was granted. 
4. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Rochester 
Minnesota on May 17, 1976. The parties have two minor daughters, 
both living with the Defendant, their mother, in the area of 
Vancouver Washington. The parties have never lived in the state of 
Utah during any part of their marriage, nor have the minor children 
ever lived in the state of Utah. 
Sometime after separation of the parties, approximately two 
years ago, Plaintiff moved to Summit County, Utah, where he filed 
for Divorce, requesting that the Utah court address other issues as 
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well, including, child custody/visitation, property division, 
medical insurance, alimony, life insurance, and debt allocation. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint, 
asserting that the State of Utah had insufficient personal 
jurisdiction over the Defendant; and, that she and the children had 
never resided in the State of Utah. 
Plaintiff moved the court for an award of Temporary Visitation 
on April 26th, 1994, at the hour of 1:30 p.m., before the Honorable 
Judge David Young. 
Judge David Young, sua sponte, and without notice, heard 
argument on the previously filed Motion to Dismiss, and denied the 
same from the bench, ruling that Plaintiff was entitled to have the 
Divorce and other matters heard in the State of Utah. Judge David 
Young next heard the argument on Plaintiff's Motion for Award of 
Temporary Visitation, and awarded Plaintiff visitation as 
requested, ordering the Defendant to produce the minor children for 
six weeks in the summer, and any other time that the Plaintiff 
travels to Washington for visitation. 
5. Summary of Arguments. 
Defendant does not have any contacts with the state of 
Utah, which would qualify as "minimum contacts" under Utah Code, 
Section 78-27-24, and prevailing caselaw. She has not availed 
herself of this jurisdiction, and could not reasonably foresee 
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being haled into the Third District Court to litigate her divorce 
action. 
To assume jurisdiction of the nonresident-defendant, 
without minimum contacts, would be contrary to prevailing caselaw, 
and violative of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and Utah Code, Section 78-27-24. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT HAS NO MINIMUM CONTACTS WITH THE STATE OF UTAH 
It has been uncontested throughout this proceeding that the 
Defendant/Appellant and the minor children have never resided 
within the state of Utah. It has also not been demonstrated that 
the Defendant/Appellant has availed herself of the laws and 
benefits of the state of Utah. This being the case, there are no 
minimum contacts upon which the state of Utah may properly assume 
jurisdiction over the person of the Defendant/Appellant, and/or the 
minor children herein, pursuant to Title 78-27-24, of the Utah 
Code, which provides that nonresidents may submit themselves to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the state of Utah upon certain 
criteria, enumerated within Section 78-27-24(6), as follows: 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether 
or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, 
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this 
state as to any claim arising from: 
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(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this 
state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate 
situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk 
located within this state at the time of 
contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided, 
in the marital relationship, within this state 
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the 
state; or the commission in this state of the 
act of giving rise to the claim, so long as 
that act is not a mere omission, failure to 
act, or occurrence over which defendant had no 
control; or, 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this 
state which gives rise to a paternity suit under 
Title 78-Chapter 45a, to determine paternity for the 
purpose of establishing responsibility for child 
support. 
None of the enumerated acts above have even been alleged by 
Plaintiff. Defendant/Appellant has affirmatively asserted that she 
has never resided in the state of Utah, nor have the minor 
children. 
The Utah court cannot properly assume personal jurisdiction of 
a nonresident defendant without minimum contacts with the state of 
Utah on the part of a nonresident defendant. Defendant/Appellant 
maintains that the "Long Arm Statute" above, is an attempt to 
codify the doctrine that "minimum contacts" with the forum state 
must be shown before personal jurisdiction of a nonresident 
defendant may be assumed. The prevailing caselaw in the state of 
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Utah recognizes the well-known precept that a nonresident defendant 
must have minimum contacts with the forum state before that state 
may assume personal jurisdiction. See Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 
791 (Utah 1988); Nunley v. Nunlev, 757 P.2d 473 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) ; 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT HAS NEVER AVAILED HERSELF OF THE PROTECTION 
OF THE LAWS AND BENEFITS OF THE STATE OF UTAH; AND COULD NOT 
REASONABLY ANTICIPATE BEING HALED INTO A UTAH COURT TO 
LITIGATE HER DIVORCE/CUSTODY PROCEEDING 
In Anderson v. American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive 
Surgeons, 807 p.2d 825 (Utah 1990), the Supreme Court of Utah 
visits the issue of minimum contacts of nonresident-defendants, as 
it relates to due process requirements. The Court reiterated its 
earlier holding in Parry v. Ernst Home Center, 779 P.2d 659 (Utah 
1989) , stating, "Defendants' contacts with Utah must be 'such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice./fl 
The Anderson decision explains at p. 828, that "Defendants 
must have 'reasonably anticipated being haled into court' here, 
World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 
S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), and they must have 
'purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting 
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activities here.'11 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253. 78 S.Ct. 
1228, 1239, 2L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). 
The Anderson decision at p. 828 further states, "The trial 
court must also balance 'the convenience of the parties' and weigh 
this forum's interest in asserting jurisdiction. Mallory Eng'g 
Inc. v. Ted R. Brown & Assoc. 618 P.2d 1004, 1008 (Utah 1980);" 
Having no minimum contacts with the state of Utah, 
Defendant/Appellant cannot be said to have availed herself of the 
protection of the laws of the state of Utah. Her only arguable 
connection to the state of Utah is the fact that the Plaintiff has 
moved here and filed for divorce; an action over which she has no 
control whatsoever. Since neither the Defendant/Appellant, nor the 
minor children live in the state of Utah, but rather the state of 
Washington, it is obviously inconvenient for them to travel here to 
participate in a divorce proceeding. Such considerations were not 
balanced nor weighed in Judge Young's Order denying Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss. 
POINT III 
TO ASSUME JURISDICTION WITHOUT MINIMUM CONTACTS VIOLATES 
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT 
In Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 839 P.2d 
1121, at 112 3, the Supreme Court of Utah again revisited the issue 
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of minimum contacts and due process. The Court stated that fl[t]o 
exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the nonresident 
defendant must have 'minimum contacts with the forum state such 
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.711 See also, 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 
154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). 
CONCLUSION 
There are no facts asserted which would give rise to 
jurisdiction over the Defendant/Appellant based upon the 
requirement of "minimum contacts" with the state of Utah. To 
assume jurisdiction absent "minimum contacts" would violate notions 
of fair play and substantial justice, and consequently the due 
process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
The trial court should be reversed, and Plaintiff's Complaint 
should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over the 
Defendant/Appellant, as requested below. 
DATED THIS September 29, 1994, 
Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Stanford Nielson, Esq. 
3760 Highland Dr., Ste. 
SLC, Ut. 84106 
200 
DATED THIS JZ <^p< • < ^ ~ day of SeptelSber, ia94 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Order on Motion to Dismiss; 
EXHIBIT B: Utah Code 78-27-24; 
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FILED""" 
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£>•* . f SummJl County 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
\J^ 
MICHAEL JOHN ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHARLEEN ANN ANDERSON 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 94-43-00036 
Judge David S. Young 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 26th day 
of April, 1994 pursuant to defendants Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's 
complaint. Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel. 
Defendant was not present but was represented by counsel of record. 
The court having considered the proffer of evidence and the argument 
of counsel now enters the following: 
ORDER 
1. This court finds that it has both subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction in this matter. 
1. Defendants motion is denied. 
Dated this of_^|5?l, 1994. 
Davids. You: 
District Cou1 \v \Cou A / r v .,£ 
'<UTAVA ^ 
BOOKQQPAGE 9 ^ 1 , 
T ? v h i K i f A 
78-27-24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts 
submitting person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16 10a-1501, 
whether or not a citizen or resident of this 6late, who 
in person or through en agent does any of the follow-
ing enumerated acU, submits himself, and if an indi-
vidual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this state as to any claim arising from 
(1) the transaction of any business within this 
state; 
(2' contracting to supply services or goods in 
this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any 
real estate situated in this state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, 
or risk located within this state at the time of 
contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate 
maintenance, or child support, having resided, in 
the marital relationship, within this state not-
withstanding subsequent departure from the 
6tate; or the commission in this state of the act 
giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not 
a mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence 
over which the defendant had no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse 
within this state which gives rise to a paternity 
suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine 
paternity for the purpose of establishing respon-
sibility for child support. 
